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1Abstract
In labor markets with worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity, the matching be-
tween ﬁrms and workers may be assortative, meaning that the most pro-
ductive workers and ﬁrms team up. We investigate this with longitudinal
population-wide matched employer-employee data from Portugal. Using
dynamic panel data methods, we quantify a ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity term
for each ﬁrm, and we relate this to the skill distribution of workers in the
ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that there is positive assortative matching, in particular
among long-lived ﬁrms. Using skill-speciﬁc estimates of an index of search
frictions, we ﬁnd that the results can only to a small extent be explained
by heterogeneity of search frictions across worker skill groups.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J21, J24, D24, J63.
Keywords: positive assortative matching, matched employer-employee data,
productivity, skill, unobserved heterogeneity, sorting, ﬁxed eﬀects.
21 Introduction
Recent research based on matched employer-employee databases has revealed that
wages of similar workers within ﬁrms and productivities of similar ﬁrms within
industries can be substantially dispersed. Moreover, a given worker may earn dif-
ferent wages at diﬀerent ﬁrms. The classical framework under which all workers
and ﬁrms are alike and can freely enter and exit the marketplace has diﬃculties
to accommodate such ﬁndings. This has spurned the development of models that
allow for search frictions and that consider wages and productivity as involving
worker-speciﬁc, ﬁrm-speciﬁc, and match-speciﬁc components. Burdett and Coles
(1999), Shimer and Smith (2000), and Shi (2001) are some examples in the theo-
retical literature. They present search models with two-sided heterogeneity and
search frictions. A major aim of these studies is to investigate the way ﬁrms and
workers sort themselves out when they form a match, and, in particular, whether
the matching is positive assortative, meaning that the best ﬁrms team up with
the best workers. Diﬀerent equilibrium matching patterns are possible, depend-
ing on key assumptions like the transferability of utility, the logsupermodularity
of the production function, and the commitment for a wage schedule. Which
matching pattern actually arises in the labor markets is in the end an empirical
question.
There are several reasons why it is important to know the actual matching
pattern in the market. First, it allows us to test diﬀerent economic models that
predict distinct matching equilibrium patterns, and this gives insights into the
realism of the assumptions on which the models rely. Second, it help us to
understand the agents’ behavior and the allocation in the labor market. Third,
it is relevant for policy. In particular, labor market policies that target welfare
of workers may have diﬀerent eﬀects depending on the existence and extent of
assortative matching, because the latter determines the range of jobs available to
a worker.
There are a few examples of empirical studies that provide evidence on assor-
tative matching (Haltiwanger et al., 1999, Van den Berg and Van Vuuren, 2003,
and Abowd et al., 2004). The latter study focuses on wages as the main outcome
variable, while the other two focus on total ﬁrm output. Speciﬁcally, Abowd
et al. (2004) work with a model that predicts that indices of worker and ﬁrm
productivity are measurable from wages, and so assortative matching is directly
manifested in a wage equation from which ﬁrm-speciﬁc and worker-speciﬁc ef-
fects can be deduced. They ﬁnd no evidence for positive assortative matching
(PAM), i.e., a positive correlation between indices of worker and ﬁrm productiv-
3ity. The wage data approach is very ﬂexible and takes account of a wide range of
endogeneity issues. However, assignment models with coordination frictions and
PAM, like the Shimer (2005) model, can generate positive or negative correlation
between the ﬁrm and person eﬀects as obtained from a wage equation. This calls
for the analysis of productivity data.
Haltiwanger et al. (1999) focus on output data. They use a panel of long-
lived ﬁrms and estimate the relationships between output, as measured by the
natural logarithm of sales per worker, and workers’ and ﬁrms’ characteristics. The
empirical speciﬁcation imposes an additive linear production function, and hence
assumes that workers’ and ﬁrms’ productivity inputs are perfectly substitutable.
The results indicate that PAM may be an important phenomenon in the US
labor market.1 Van den Berg and Van Vuuren (2003) investigate the sign and
the extent of assortative matching in the Danish labor market. As Haltiwanger
et al. (1999), they take additive linear production functions and estimate these
on a cross-section. They use the model estimates to construct a measure of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc heterogeneity and relate this measure to workforce characteristics.2 They
conclude that PAM is a common phenomenon.
In the present paper, we empirically investigate the matching pattern be-
tween ﬁrms and workers using ﬁrm productivity data. We exploit that the data
are longitudinal in both the worker and the ﬁrm dimension. The data cover
the population of establishments in manufacturing and services in the private
sector in Portugal. They contain annual detailed information on the workforce
composition and ﬁrms’ output over a ﬁfteen year period. Using dynamic panel
data methods, we quantify a ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity term for each ﬁrm, and
we relate this to the skill distribution of workers in the ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, we
estimate a general relationship between the output of the ﬁrm and its workforce
composition, which we approximate using a translog speciﬁcation. Estimating
this translog approximation by ﬁxed-eﬀects methods, we are able to quantify the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity, and relate this to the skills of workers in the ﬁrm. We
use the bootstrap to estimate standard errors.
Not all ﬁrms participate for the full ﬁfteen years in our sample. Survival
1They estimate regression in levels and in ﬁrst diﬀerences. In the ﬁrst case, they ﬁnd
statistical signiﬁcance for workforce characteristics. In the second case, where they allow for
ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, the eﬀect of the workforce characteristics disappears. This may hint
at assortative matching. However, this is not directly addressed by the authors.
2More speciﬁcally, they take the coeﬃcient of a regression of the fraction of low-skilled em-
ployees on ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity as a measure of assortative matching. Note however, that
they only had access to a single cross-section, which requires them to make strong assumptions
in order to calculate the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀect.
4may depend on workforce characteristics, and hence the results may be aﬀected
by selectivity of surviving ﬁrms. We therefore estimate models on panels of
diﬀerent length to check on the robustness of our ﬁndings. We also check whether
heterogeneity of search frictions across worker skills can explain PAM. For this
purpose, we use data on job transitions to compute an index of search frictions
for the diﬀerent skills.
As we use Portuguese data, we brieﬂy discuss some distinctive features of
the Portuguese labor market (see also OECD, 1996, 1997, 1998, Vieira et al.,
2005, Cardoso and Portela, 2005, and references in these sources). Compared
to most EU and OECD countries, Portugal has low unemployment, low average
labor productivity, and very high employment protection. Centralized collective
bargaining covers most of the workforce. Private costs to geographic mobility are
high. To some extent, the institutional constraints may hamper job transitions
into better matches, and thus the degree of assortativeness may be particularly
visible in the matches that occur upon workers’ entry into the labor market. In
this regard, it is relevant that youth unemployment in Portugal represented in
the 1990s almost the double (or more) of the overall rate.3 Among young unem-
ployed, around 50% have never worked before, and the concentration of long-term
unemployment is high: it varied between 40% and 20% from the mid-1980s to
the late 1990s.4 Furthermore, youth unemployment is higher for individuals with
tertiary education than for those with lower education. Along with the expansion
of higher education during the 1980s and early 1990s, unemployment increased
for university graduates. This did not increase the likelihood of these individuals
moving into non-university jobs (Cardoso, 2005). This may suggest that individ-
uals take quite long time until they reach their ﬁrst match but that these ﬁrst
matches are to some extent assortative.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the empirical ap-
proach, with two subsections. In Subsection 2.1 we describe the speciﬁcation and
estimation method used to quantify the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. In Subsection
2.2 we present the measures for assortative matching and we give details about
the sensitivity analysis of those measures. Section 3 presents the data and de-
scribes the construction of the variables. Results are reported in Section 4. In
Section 5, we investigate whether search frictions heterogeneity may be behind
3For EU 15, in the 1990s, youth unemployment never reached the double of the general
unemployment rate.
4This concentration of long-term unemployment among the young was also seen in other
southern European countries. For the time period considered, this group of countries had the
highest concentration in the EU 15.
5our ﬁndings on PAM. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical approach
Our ultimate objective in this study is to analyze empirically the way the two ex
ante heterogeneous sides of the labor market sort themselves out by matching.
For this, we ﬁrst need to know the speciﬁc productivity of workers and ﬁrms.
However, these are not directly observable in the data. What we can observe is
the production of a ﬁrm that operate with its workforce. To obtain a measure
of the speciﬁc productivity of workers and ﬁrms, we need thus to disentangle the
contribution of each of them on the observed production. Intuitively, two ﬁrms
having the same workforce composition can produce diﬀerent outputs if their
management skills or structure are diﬀerent. In the same way, two ﬁrms with
common management abilities or structure may have diﬀerent outputs if their
workforces diﬀer.
Our empirical strategy to deal with this problem is based on a framework
where heterogeneity in labor inputs and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity play both a
central role. In particular, we assume that the observed output in ﬁrm i is
the result of a relationship between diﬀerent qualities of labor and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
(unobserved) heterogeneity. The latter is derived from ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates of
a translog approximation, which can be seen as a second order approximation
to a generalized production function. Details about this translog approximation
and the estimation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity are presented in Subsection 2.1.
The productivity of the labor input of a ﬁrm is measured by the proportion
of high-skilled labor in the total labor input of the ﬁrm. Assortative matching
is then assessed by measures of association between the estimated ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity and the proportion of high quality labor within the ﬁrm.5 These
measures are discussed in Subsection 2.2.
2.1 Estimation of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity
We postulate that the output Yi observed in ﬁrm i is determined by a functional
relationship between various diﬀerent observed qualities of labor and the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity:
5Assortative matching is often measured by the correlation between job complexity and
worker skill. We take the ﬁrm (instead of job) as the relevant unit, and so the workers skills
are summarized to the ﬁrm level.
6Yi = F(Lij)vi (1)
where Lij denotes the quality of labor aggregate oﬀered by workers with skill level
j in ﬁrm i, vi stands for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved productive skill and F(.)
represents a medium or long term production objective which is predetermined
with respect to the actual observed value Yi.
We assume that in ﬁrm i, within the quality of labor aggregate of skill j,
Lij, workers with diﬀerent demographic characteristics are perfectly substitutable
inputs with potentially diﬀerent marginal products. For example, in case we
distinguished workers only by gender, Lij would be deﬁned as:
Lij = Mij + φFFij (2)
where Mij and Fij are, respectively, the number of males and females with skill
j, and φF is the marginal productivity of women relative men, within skill j.
For our analysis, we deﬁne quality of labor as:
















where MAhSij (FAhSij) stands for the proportion of hours oﬀered by males (fe-
males) in age group h and schooling j, and φ
j
K are parameters to be estimated.
φ
j
F is the marginal productivity of women relative to men within schooling level
j, φ
j
A2 is the marginal productivity of workers in the second age group relative to
those in the ﬁrst age group within schooling level j, and so forth.6 This speciﬁ-
cation is similar to Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) and Hellerstein et al. (1999).
However, we allow here for greater ﬂexibility in terms of marginal productivity
diﬀerential between diﬀerent demographic groups.
For F(.) we specify the translog form, which may generally be viewed as a
second order approximation to a generalized production function. We take this
speciﬁcation because we want to have F(.) as ﬂexible as possible in order to obtain
the best possible estimate of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity.7 The ﬂexibility of the
translog form is well known and it is the reason why it is increasingly and widely
6Note that the deﬁnition of L implies that productivity diﬀerentials between groups are
indicated by φj being estimated to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one (rather than zero). For
example, an estimate of 0.8 for φ
j
F would mean that women in schooling level j are on average
20% less productive than men with the same schooling level.
7Conventional Cobb-Douglas functions were also estimated. However the results for the
translog approximation reject the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation.
7employed in empirical work. Basically, this form permits a greater variety of
substitution patterns among input factors than functions based on constant and
equal elasticities of substitution among all pairs of inputs. See Christensen et al.
(1973).
With three levels of labor skills (j = 1,2,3, where 1 and 3 stand for the lowest










γjkln(Ljit)ln(Lkit) + ci + it (4)
with γjk = γkj for all (j,k)
where Yit denotes the real sales per worked hour of ﬁrm i = 1,2,...,N in year
t = 1,2,...,T, ci = ln(vi) stands for time constant characteristics of ﬁrm i and it
are idiosyncratic errors, assumed to be independent and identically distributed
over time and ﬁrms, with zero mean and equal variance. Ljit, previously deﬁned,
are time varying regressors assumed to be strictly exogenous, conditional on the
unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀect ci.8 The parameters γj and φj are to be estimated
common to every ﬁrm within each industry. Two control variables were added to
(4): the size of the workforce and an indicator for single establishment ﬁrms.
This speciﬁcation incorporates the idea that two mediocre workers do not
combine to make a good one, meaning that quantity of one skill type of labor
cannot be completely substituted by any combination of the other skill types.
Under this framework, in order to produce, a ﬁrm needs a workforce that combines
the three labor skills.9
Under this speciﬁcation, labor quality is allowed to diﬀer across skill levels,
and across age and gender within skill categories. Furthermore, skills are comple-
mentary and workers with diﬀerent ages and gender are substitutable but allowed
to have diﬀerent marginal productivities. Notice that we allow the productivity
diﬀerential between age groups to vary across skill.10
8Later we relax this assumption of strict exogeneity. See description of the robustness test
and respective results in the end of Section 4.1.
9This is the reason for considering no more than three types of labor skills. In the estimation
we can only use ﬁrms for which we have no zero observations on any of the skills. A more detailed
skill classiﬁcation would lead to a large number of diﬀerent skills and would force us to discard
a large number of ﬁrms from our data.
10This function is supermodular in c and L3. This is suﬃcient for PAM in a frictionless
environment. If strong search frictions hold, supermodularity is only necessary and the suﬃcient
condition for PAM is then logsupermodularity. Notice however that the speciﬁed function does
not have this property, since (lnfx)xy = 0.
8Equation (4) is estimated by nonlinear least squares (NLS). We do not want
to impose that ci and Ljit are uncorrelated and therefore use the within trans-
formation of (4):


















+it − i (5)
The within or ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation procedure is convenient for our pur-
poses. First, our interest is mainly in ci as a measure of unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity. We can retrieve an estimate of this (nuisance) parameter after hav-
ing estimated the model. Second, the condition E{ci | Ljit} = 0 will be violated
in the case of assortative matching. Finally, our sample is possibly subject to
non-random attrition and under some assumptions we can still consistently es-
timate the model parameters with the ﬁxed-eﬀect method. Lindeboom et al.
(2002) provided a more detailed analysis of the possible sources of endogenous
attrition and the advantages of the ﬁxed-eﬀects method.
Having estimated the parameters γj and φ
j
k, we proceed with the estimation
of ci as
ˆ ci = ln(Yi) −
3 X
j=1





c γjkln(c Lji)ln(c Lki) (6)
The ci term captures stable key features such as the organizational and man-
agerial skill, capital and technology endowment, to the extent that they are time-
constant over the observed time interval. We use it as the measure of the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc productivity skill.
The estimates ˆ ci are unbiased for any sample size. However, since they are
time-series averages, their variance only tends to zero as T tends to inﬁnity.
Therefore, ˆ ci are consistent if T is suﬃciently large.
2.2 Measures for assortative matching
We next focus on the relation between the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀect and the workforce
skill. A positive association between these two indicates the presence of PAM. The
workforce skill of a speciﬁc ﬁrm is measured by the average (over time) fraction
9of highly-educated workers in that ﬁrm (L3i). We use three association measures:
the traditional correlation coeﬃcient, the rank correlation coeﬃcient and the
regression coeﬃcient of a regression of the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect on the proportion of
highly educated workers in the ﬁrm. As with the estimation of the production
function, these measures of assortative matching are estimated for each industry
separately.
The traditional correlation coeﬃcient identiﬁes the sign and the degree of
(im)perfection of the linear relation between the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity and the
proportion of high-educated workers in the ﬁrm. A value of (+)-1 would indicate,
for our data, P(ci = a+bL3i) = 1, for some constant a and a constant b(>) < 0.
Since this correlation coeﬃcient is dimensionless, we also present the estimates
for b. This regression coeﬃcient provides us a quantitative interpretation, giving
an estimate of the average change of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity in response to an
one percentage point change in the proportion of highly-educated workers.
The rank correlation coeﬃcient is an association measure that uses the ranks
instead of the actual values of the variables. As the traditional correlation coef-
ﬁcient, it varies between -1 and 1, but it is less sensitive to extreme values and
it captures broader forms of association than a linear relation. With the rank
correlation coeﬃcient we get thus a measure of the degree of ordering of the
two heterogeneous sides of the labor market. A value of 1 would mean that the
highest-ci ﬁrm matches with the highest- L3i workforce, and the second higher-ci
ﬁrm teams up with the second higher- L3i workforce, and so on; but the under-
lying relation between ci and L3i is not required to be linear.
Not all ﬁrms in our sample participate in all waves and it is likely that the ﬁrm
survival rate is related to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved productivity ci. In the case
of assortative matching the ci will also be related to the skill level of the workforce.
A consequence of this is that our association measures may change as the panel
ages. Haltiwanger et al. (2007) investigate the adjustment of the workforce over
the ageing of the ﬁrm and they ﬁnd it to be consistent with both selection and
learning. On the one hand, ﬁrms with better unobserved characteristics and
better matches are found to have higher survival probabilities. On the other
hand, new ﬁrms adjust their workforce composition towards the workforce of the
longer existing ﬁrms. Under these mechanisms, a panel of long lived ﬁrms is likely
to have ﬁrms with a higher average speciﬁc quality and with the best matches
than one panel of shorter time interval. In this case, we would ﬁnd stronger
evidence for assortative matching in the former panel than in the latter.
To evaluate the impact of this dynamics, we compute our measures for assor-
tative matching using four panels with diﬀerent minimum number of observations
10per ﬁrm: two, six, nine, twelve.
3 The “Quadros de Pessoal” data
Our analyses are based on Quadros de Pessoal, a longitudinal matched employer-
employee data set gathered by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor and Solidarity
(see also, e.g., Vieira et al., 2005, and Cardoso and Portela, 2005, for descrip-
tions and analyses of this dataset). The data are collected through ﬁrms’ annual
reports. Firms are legally obliged to do this. The public administration and do-
mestic service are not covered and the coverage of the agricultural sector is low.
On the other hand, the manufacturing and private services sector is almost fully
covered.
The ﬁrm data contain information on sales, employment, detailed industry,
location, legal setting and ownership. The worker information includes gender,
age, occupation, schooling, tenure, mechanism of wage bargaining, normal and
overtime hours of work and gross monthly earnings (split into several compo-
nents). The reported data report on the status of the workers in a reference week
(March up to 1993, October since 1994).
An identiﬁcation code is assigned to every ﬁrm at the time it enters the data
set for the ﬁrst time. The Ministry performs various checks to guarantee that
the ﬁrm code does not change. The identiﬁcation code of the worker is a trans-
formation of the worker’s social security number. Based on these identiﬁcation
numbers, one can match workers and ﬁrms, and follow both over time. The ﬁrm
and worker data cover the period 1986-2000.
For each worker, we compute the monthly total (normal plus extra) hours of
work. Workers are then grouped according to the three demographic characteris-
tics that formed the labor types in our speciﬁcation: gender, age and schooling.
We consider three age groups – under 30, between 30 and 50, and above 50 –
and three schooling categories11 – low education (less than 4 years), medium ed-
ucation (6 or 9 years) and high education (more than 10 years 12). The grouping
leads to 18 types of workers within the ﬁrm. The proportions of hours worked by
the diﬀerent types of workers within the ﬁrm are our measure of labor inputs.
There is some item non-response in the reported age and schooling (an aver-
age of 6% in each year13). We discarded these individual observations from our
11The reported education is the highest completed school degree of the worker.
12High education category includes both the secondary school and higher education.
13These percentages include actual non-response and schooling reported as ‘Ignored’ or
‘Other’.
11sample. In these cases, the workforce composition within a speciﬁc ﬁrm is based
on the remaining workers of whom we observe all characteristics. We implicitly
assume that the item non-response is random. This may introduce some system-
atic measurement error on Ljit. An alternative for this would be to eliminate
every ﬁrm with at least one worker not fully characterized. This would however,
result in the elimination of a large number of ﬁrms.
Beyond these workforce characteristics, we consider the following ﬁrm’s vari-
ables: sales, total number of hours worked within the ﬁrm, industry, number of
establishments, size of workforce and geographical location.14
The reported sales volume relates to the previous year and is measured in
thousands of escudos (a thousand escudos is around 5 euros). We use real sales
(prices 1997) per worked hour as the measure of output of the ﬁrm. In this way,
we control for diﬀerences in working times between various labor types (notably
males and females). To obtain sales per hour we compute the ratio of the volume
of monthly sales15 and the sum of monthly hours of all workers in the ﬁrm.16
Our dependent variable is real sales (per hour worked) and we therefore only
keep ﬁrms in Manufacturing, Construction and Trade. In our translog function
workers in diﬀerent schooling categories are imperfectly substitutable inputs. A
consequence of this is that output is zero in any ﬁrm that does not have workers
in one of the three schooling categories that we consider. We therefore had to
eliminate ﬁrms who had either no low-, medium or high-educated workers. We
also excluded the observations in the top and bottom 1% of the sales distribution.
Our within estimator requires at least 2 observations for a given ﬁrm. With all
these selection criteria we end up with a panel of 39 543 ﬁrms and 204 537 ﬁrm-
year observations. Around 45% of the ﬁrms are observed for 5 or more years,
slightly more than 20% for at least 8 years and 6.5% for the full observation
period. The participation pattern of ﬁrms in the panel is given in Table 1.
Descriptive statistics for the whole panel and individual industries are pre-
sented in Table 2.
In terms of the distribution of schooling, ﬁrms in our sample tend to employ
14The hours worked in the ﬁrm and the size of the workforce are not aﬀected by the selection
that we make when we deal with the item non-response. The variable hours worked is computed
before that selection and the size of the workforce is directly reported by the ﬁrm.
15We assume monthly sales to equal the annual sales divided by 12.
16Until 1993, reported workers are those employed in the ﬁrm in March. From 1994 onwards,
the reference period was October. We use the characteristics of the workforce of March of year
t to explain sales of year t−1, for t ≤ 1993 and the workforce of October of t to explain sales of
t, if t ≥ 1994. So, we do not use the data on sales of 1993. This reduces the maximum length
of the panel to 13 waves.
12Number Absolute Relative Relative
of years frequency frequency cumul. freq.
2 9679 24.48 24.48
3 6621 16.74 41.22
4 4950 12.52 53.74
5 3913 9.90 63.63
6 3150 7.97 71.60
7 2598 6.57 78.17
8 1833 4.64 82.81
9 1638 4.14 86.95
10 1296 3.28 90.23
11 1297 3.28 93.51
12 1152 2.91 96.42
13 1416 3.58 100.00
Total 39543 100.00
Table 1: Participation pattern of ﬁrms in the panel
more low educated workers than any others: low educated workers constitute
around 45% of the workforce and high educated workers represent about 19%. In
Trade, high education takes a relatively high share (25%).
On average ﬁrms employ more men than women. As expected, this diﬀerence
is especially large in Construction. The gender diﬀerences vary with education.
The shares of men and women are closer among high educated workers, especially
in Trade.
Also the distribution of age changes with schooling level: workers aged 30-50
dominate among the low educated, and medium and high education are primarily
younger workers. Trade tends to employ more older workers than the average ﬁrm
in the panel.
Furthermore, the average ﬁrm in our panel employs around 57 workers. The
smaller ﬁrms are those in the Trade and the largest those in Manufacturing.
Regarding the sales, ﬁrms have on average a volume of 8 thousands escudos per
each hour of work. Firms in Manufacturing have the lowest average sales. On the
other hand, Trade is the sector with the largest sales and the smallest workforce.
It is important to notice that the data show a great amount of heterogeneity
in the workforce composition. The large standard deviations presented in Table 2
indicate that the workforce composition tends to be substantially diﬀerent across
ﬁrms. We found evidence for heterogeneity on several other dimensions. Even
after removing year and industry means, we found large variation of the skill
composition across ﬁrms. For example, the distribution of the proportion of low
educated workers still presents an interquartile range of 31 percentage points
13Variable All Inds Manufact. Construct. Trade
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Schooling level 1 45.2 23.3 51.2 23.0 58.2 23.3 37.0 20.4
Males, Under 30 7.4 11.1 8.3 11.2 15.2 14.8 5.0 9.0
Males, 30-50 16.5 14.8 16.9 14.4 29.1 15.5 13.4 13.6
Males, Above 50 7.0 9.5 6.8 8.7 12.1 12.2 6.1 9.2
Females, Under 30 3.8 8.8 6.3 11.2 0.3 1.7 2.3 6.1
Females, 30-50 8.3 11.6 10.8 12.9 1.0 3.3 7.5 10.8
Females, Above 50 2.2 5.1 2.1 4.4 0.5 2.3 2.8 6.1
Schooling level 2 35.9 18.9 35.5 19.9 27.7 18.9 38.1 17.4
Males, Under 30 13.0 13.6 13.3 13.9 14.9 14.6 12.3 13.1
Males, 30-50 8.6 10.2 7.2 8.8 8.7 10.2 9.8 11.2
Males, Above 50 1.4 3.9 1.1 2.9 1.1 3.3 1.8 4.7
Females, Under 30 7.5 12.5 9.5 14.3 1.2 3.6 7.1 11.4
Females, 30-50 4.9 7.9 4.2 6.5 1.5 3.8 6.4 9.3
Females, Above 50 0.5 2.4 0.3 1.5 0.2 1.3 0.7 3.1
Schooling level 3 18.8 15.2 13.3 12.1 14.1 12.0 24.9 16.1
Males, Under 30 4.6 7.6 3.5 6.0 4.2 6.6 5.8 8.9
Males, 30-50 4.9 7.6 3.8 5.9 4.4 6.5 6.0 8.9
Males, Above 50 0.9 3.1 0.7 2.2 0.7 2.5 1.1 3.8
Females, Under 30 4.8 7.9 3.1 5.2 2.9 5.4 6.8 9.8
Females, 30-50 3.4 6.4 2.1 4.2 1.9 4.3 4.8 8.0
Females, Above 50 0.2 1.8 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.4 2.4
Workforce size 57.4 170.7 84.5 203.4 62.8 188.6 31.4 123.4
Real sales per hour 8.2 10.0 5.0 6.6 5.9 8.5 11.6 11.6
No observations: 204 537 87 786 20 684 96 067
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Notes: The demographic groups within the workforce are measured in percentage.
(p.p.) and that range is of 15 p.p. for the proportion of high educated workers.
We also observe substantial variation in the workforce composition over time
(within the panel, which means, over ﬁrm’s ageing), as we may see from Table
3.17 We present here changes for 4-, 8- and 12-year time horizons.
In general terms, the share of low educated workers within the ﬁrms tend to
decrease substantially over time, while the shares of the other skill groups both
increase. Looking at the interquartile ranges and variation coeﬃcients, we see
17Measures for age groups were also computed. Though we do not report them here, we also
found substantial heterogeneity for age composition.
14Schooling
level 1 level 2 level 3
four-years changes: Lij4 − Lij1
mean -5.1 3.9 1.2
P75 − P25 16 19 10
variation coef. -3.3 4.5 10
eight-years changes: Lij8 − Lij1
mean -11.1 8.8 2.3
P75 − P25 22 22 12
variation coef. -1.7 2.1 5.6
twelve-years changes: Lij12 − Lij1
mean -15.1 10.5 4.6
P75 − P25 20 20 9
variation coef. -1.1 1.7 2.8
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on time changes of workforce composition
Notes: The demographic groups within the workforce are measured in percent-
age. Variation coeﬃcient is deﬁned as the ratio between mean and standard
deviation.
that time changes exhibit also large variation across ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd that this
heterogeneity across ﬁrms in terms of adjustments of the workforce composition
tends to decrease over ﬁrm’s ageing. For example, the variation coeﬃcient of the
time changes of the highest skill decreases from 10 to 2.8 when we move from a
4- to 12-years time horizon.
We estimate the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity and the measures of assortative
matching on panels of diﬀerent length. We do this to check the robustness of our
ﬁndings. We use panels in which ﬁrms are observed for at least two, six, nine
and twelve years in the period 1986-2000.
4 Results
4.1 Estimates for the translog speciﬁcation
Here we present the estimates of the translog form described in Subsection 2.1.
The models are estimated on the four diﬀerent panels. Since our interest on these
estimates lies on their use for quantifying the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity, here we
only report the estimates obtained for the largest panel (Table 4). The parameters
are estimated by industry using nonlinear least squares on equation (5). The table
also provides information on statistical tests. For labor quality variables, we test
15whether the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. However, given our
deﬁnition of labor quality aggregates, the test of interest for the demographic
characteristics is whether the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. We
indicate for each variable whether the relevant hypothesis is rejected.
Since the results for the parameters γ of the translog function are not directly
interpretable, here we focus on the estimates of marginal productivities of the
demographic groups (φ).
The coeﬃcients for females suggest that women are more productive in Man-
ufacturing. This is also the case for highly educated female workers in the Trade
and Construction sector.
The estimated age proﬁles vary with labor quality. They suggest that pro-
ductivity increases considerably with age among low educated workers. However,
among medium- and high-skilled workers, individuals aged 30-50 are the most
productive. The diﬀerential between age groups is much lower for high educated
workers. The Construction sector is an exception. Here the young are the most
productive among the low educated workers.
Finally, coeﬃcients for workforce size indicate that large ﬁrms are on average
less productive.
For the various reasons previously discussed, we estimate the productivity
regression 4 using the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator. However, this estimator has the
drawback of requiring strict exogeneity of the regressors. In our case, this means
that decisions on the workforce composition (Lij) can not aﬀected by past or
contemporaneous shocks on productivity or demand (i).
In general, this is a quite strong assumption. Though, it may be not very
strong in the context of the Portuguese labor market, which presents the strictest
regulation on employment protection within OECD. The strict regulation is very
likely to act as a barrier to feedbacks from demand or productivity shocks to
workforce composition.
As a robustness test, we estimate the productivity regression assuming work-
force composition to be predetermined instead of strict exogenous. This allows
for correlation between the regressors and past shocks. Under this assumption,
we need to use the diﬀerence GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). No-
tice that this is an estimator for linear models and to adjust to non-linear case
would be quite cumbersome. Therefore, for this part of the analysis we use the
linearized version of the translog speciﬁcation.18
The results obtained with diﬀerence GMM turn out to be mediocre, as the
18The linearization implies that, within each type of labor Lij, demographic groups are not
distinguished.
16various sets of instruments we used were all rejected by the Hansen test. Since the
variables were found to be somewhat persistent, we proceed using system GMM
(Arellano and Bover, 1995, Blundell and Bond, 1999). The extended sets of
instruments are again rejected. In a third stage, we estimate a dynamic version
of the productivity regression, allowing the shocks i to be serially correlated.
We estimate a large variety of speciﬁcations with diﬀerent sets of instruments
but results were not satisfying for any of the cases. Even if we ﬁnd some sets of
instruments to be valid and errors to be serially uncorrelated, the explanatory
power of the linear regression productivity is always very poor, with workforce
composition being basically insigniﬁcant.19
In few words, though these estimators allow for more ﬂexibility in terms of
the exogeneity of the regressors, they do not produce satisfying results in our
setting.20 We proceed our analysis based on the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates of the
translog speciﬁcation previously presented.
4.2 Measures for assortative matching
We use the estimates of the parameters γ and φ of the translog approximation, to
calculate the ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved productivity ci. Next we relate the estimate
ˆ ci to a skill measure of the workforce. The skill level of workforce is measured as
the time average of the share of high-educated workers in the ﬁrm.
In this subsection we present three diﬀerent measures for the association be-
tween the skill of workforce and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity: traditional correla-
tion coeﬃcient, rank correlation coeﬃcient and regression coeﬃcient (see Section
2.2). The association measures were computed with four diﬀerent panels. This
was done in order to check on the robustness of our ﬁndings. A high positive
association is an indication of strong PAM. The results are presented in Table 5.
Panel 1, 2, 3 and 4 are panels that include only ﬁrms that are observed for at
least 2, 6, 9 and 12 years, respectively. The dimension of each panel is presented
in the bottom part of the table. Together with the point estimates, we present
information on their accuracy, obtained through bootstrapping.
A ﬁrst look on the Table 5 gives a very clear qualitative conclusion. Our
results provide evidence for PAM in the Portuguese labor market. The three
19Results for the several speciﬁcations and persistence of the series are available upon request.
20A good performance of these estimators is well-established in the estimation of production
functions, which is slightly diﬀerent from our case. Note that our objective is primarily to
estimate the unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity by correcting for observed workforce char-
acteristics in a ﬂexible way, while usual estimation of production functions use series of labor
and capital inputs in order to estimate elasticities and returns to scale of those inputs.
17measures are signiﬁcantly positive for all sectors in almost every panel.
The size of the association measures suggests that PAM is also quantitatively
important. There are however, some diﬀerences across sectors. All measures and
panels provide consistent evidence that Construction is the sector in which PAM
is stronger, followed by Manufacturing and then Trade. In Construction, the
correlation between ﬁrm’s and worker’s skills is estimated to be close to 0.37 in the
panel of the shortest length. Notice that the traditional and the rank correlation
coeﬃcients are very close being respectively of 0.371 and 0.365. This similarity is
generally observed in the other sectors and remaining panels. This indicates that
workers and ﬁrms in each sector tend to match following an ordering pattern that
is almost fully described by a linear relation. In Manufacturing, these correlations
are very close to 0.30 and in Trade close to 0.15.
The third panel of the table reports the estimates of the regression coeﬃ-
cient of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity on the proportion of high-educated workers
in the ﬁrm. The values are generally large and signiﬁcant. These results indi-
cate that the magnitude of changes in the workforce composition on ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity is large.
As expected, we ﬁnd higher association measures when we increase the length
of the panel, i.e. when we condition on ﬁrm survival up to a certain number of
years. The surviving ﬁrms have on average a higher ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity and
a higher skill level of the workforce. This holds for every sector. A notable increase
is observed for the construction sector: the correlation coeﬃcient between ﬁrm’s
and workers’ skills increases from 0.37 in Panel 1 to 0.63 in Panel 4. The regression
coeﬃcient of this same industry goes up from 3.05 to 5.35. In Manufacturing,
the change in the measures follows the same features. The correlation coeﬃcient
ranges between 0.30 and 0.37, taking intermediate values in Panels 2 and 3.
Similarly, the regression coeﬃcient increases from 2.23 to 2.52.
These measures of assortative matching were also computed taking the lowest
education category as reference instead of the highest and they are presented
in Table 6. The results are consistent with the PAM. In particular, the correla-
tions between ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity and the proportion of the lowest-educated
workers are negative for all industries. Looking at the diﬀerent panels, we ﬁnd the
same conclusion regarding the sensitivity of assortative matching to the length
of the analyzed panel. In general, the measures become more and more negative
as we increase the minimum number of observations per ﬁrm.
We also measured assortative matching taking all the analyzed industries
together. We do not present the results here, but the sign of assortative matching
for the whole sampled market is also positive and its extent is about an average
18of the those obtained for each industry.
The results on the sensitivity of measures of assortative matching to the sta-
bility of sampled ﬁrms lend some credence to the hypothesis of learning and
selection, a hypothesis already supported by previous empirical literature like
Haltiwanger et al. (2007), as discussed in Section 2.2. It also means that the
degree of PAM may depend on sample selection criteria, like ﬁrm survival.
5 Search frictions heterogeneity
The association measures tell us whether or not assortative matching is impor-
tant. It is possible that PAM is driven by heterogeneity in the amount of search
frictions across skill levels. All worker types may be attractive for all ﬁrm types,
but the high-skill workers may simply be less constrained by search frictions than
the low-skill workers. In this scenario, high-quality workers would reach the high-
quality ﬁrms more easily, leading to the observation of PAM. Stated diﬀerently,
if we do not ﬁnd evidence for search frictions heterogeneity across skills then
PAM is due to high-productivity ﬁrms (workers) not wanting to team up with
low-productivity workers (ﬁrms).
Van den Berg and Van Vuuren (2003) have addressed this issue before. They
call the two explanations for PAM “two-sided sorting” and “search friction hetero-
geneity”. They distinguish between the two explanations by investigating whether
sectors and regions where the PAM is high also have low search frictions. They
ﬁnd that sectors and regions with lower frictions display more PAM.
In this paper, we use data on job transitions to estimate an index of search
frictions for the three skill levels within diﬀerent submarkets. We then investi-
gate whether the degrees of frictions tend to diﬀer across skills and whether the
magnitude of that inter-skill diﬀerence is correlated with the extent of assortative
matching across submarkets.
Our index for search frictions is deﬁned as the ratio between the probability of
moving to another ﬁrm and the probability of leaving the labor force. Considering
the history of each worker between period t and period t + 1, we deﬁne three
possible outcomes: stay in the same ﬁrm, move to another ﬁrm of the private
sector and leave the labor force of the private sector (unemployment, public
sector, retirement,...).
The analysis is based on various short (three year long) panels of individual
workers. Information on the ﬁrst year is only used to select individuals who are
employed for more than one year. We do this to ensure some homogeneity in the
search environment faced by the sampled workers. The data on the second and
19third year are then used to obtain the outcome of relevance.
For each worker we record information on schooling, age, gender and on lo-
cation and industry of their employers. The schooling, age, gender and industry
variables are deﬁned as in the panel of ﬁrms. We keep only workers employed
in Manufacturing, Trade or Construction. Location is aggregated to ﬁve large
regions: North, Centre, Lisbon and Tagus Valley, Alentejo and Algarve, and a
last one with the islands Azores and Madeira. Submarkets are deﬁned by com-
binations of industry and region.
Tables 7, 8 and 9 report the results for the index of search frictions in each of
the industries. For sake of simplicity, we discuss here the results for four pairs of
years and three regions. The last column of the tables gives the inters-kill diﬀer-
ential, computed as the diﬀerence between the indicator for high-skilled workers
and low-skilled workers. This is our measure for search friction heterogeneity.
Table 7 shows that in Manufacturing the inter-skill diﬀerential varies between
-0.051 and 0.368. For Construction, results of Table 8 indicate that the inter-skill
diﬀerential is in the range -0.093 and 0.316, being some of these not signiﬁcant.
The situation for Trade is quite similar: values are between -0.026 and 0.282, and
insigniﬁcant for some years.
These tables oﬀer similar broad conclusions: the values of the inter-skill dif-
ferential vary within a quite large range, and some of them are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Furthermore, in some cases the indicator takes on a negative
sign, which contradicts the hypothesis that high-skilled workers face lower search
frictions. We can also observe that there is a clear global time trend: the inter-
skill diﬀerential increased from 1987 to 1999 and in the last years the inter-skill
diﬀerential is generally positive.21
These results indicate that there is some search friction heterogeneity across
skills, notably in the more recent years. It has to be noted though that our mea-
sure of search frictions deviates from what is commonly used in the literature:
the ratio of job oﬀer arrival rate and the separation rate (see e.g. Ridder and Van
den Berg, 2003, and Mortensen, 2003). Unfortunately, our data do not provide
the joint distribution of job durations and wages that is necessary for the estima-
tion of this ratio, so we are forced to rely only on information on job transitions.
Basically, our index diﬀers from the traditional one in the sense that the observed
job-to-job transitions are those received oﬀers that were accepted, so they depend
on the relative position of the workers in the wage distribution. Considering that
high-skill workers tend to have higher positions in the wage distribution, we can
21For the cases not reported here (remaining years and regions), the situation is similar. Only
for the region "Islands" signiﬁcance is rarer, perhaps because of the smaller size of the sample.
20expect that our index underestimates more heavily the search frictions for high-
skill than it does for low-skill. This would result in an underestimation of the
inter-skill diﬀerence of search frictions.
One can reasonably assume that this underestimation is roughly the same
across submarkets, and thus use the obtained results to investigate in a valid way
whether the pattern of heterogeneity is systematically related with the degree of
assortative matching across submarkets.22
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics for both search frictions diﬀerences
and assortative matching. The means for the measures of assortative matching
indicate that PAM measured by regional submarkets is clearly lower. The correla-
tion between search frictions diﬀerences and assortative matching is estimated to
be positive but not high. Considering the correlation coeﬃcient as the measure
of assortative matching, the correlation between search frictions heterogeneity
and assortative matching is around 0.20. Taking the regression coeﬃcient, this
correlation becomes lower, about 0.14.
These results do not provide a clear evidence that behind the found PAM lies
or does not lie search frictions heterogeneity across workers skills. Data that is
more informative on search frictions would be necessary to provide a more clear
evidence.
6 Conclusion
Labor market theories provide diﬀerent and contradicting predictions regarding
the equilibrium pattern of assortative matching between worker and ﬁrms. We use
a unique Portuguese data set to test these predictions. These data are particularly
suitable for our purposes, for various reasons: the data are longitudinal in both
work and ﬁrm dimensions, the output of all ﬁrms in the private sector is known
for several years, a detailed characterization of the complete workforce of the ﬁrm
is available, and the number of hours worked by each employee is reported. With
this information we are able to extract the ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved productivity
and use these to test whether positive assortative matching (PAM) is important
in the Portuguese labor market.
The empirical results on the sign and extent of assortative matching are un-
ambiguous. There is strong PAM in the Portuguese labor market. In other words,
ﬁrms and workers of similar productivities tend to match together. We also ﬁnd
that the degree of assortative matching varies across industries.
22We estimate the measures for assortative matching for each submarket and year.
21As discussed in Section 1, the Portuguese labor market has institutional fea-
tures that may boost PAM. It would be an interesting topic for further research
to examine whether other countries, with diﬀerent institutions, display diﬀerent
degrees of PAM.
A sensitivity analysis based on panels of diﬀerent lengths shows that assorta-
tive matching is stronger when measured among long-lived ﬁrms only. It is not
easy to interpret this result. After all, long-lived ﬁrms compete with short-lived
ﬁrms. However, long-lived ﬁrms are on average more productive, so it seems
that as time proceeds their part of the market moves towards the complete-
segmentation equilibrium assignment outcome in a perfect market (Becker, 1973).
The results on the question whether PAM is explained by cross-skill hetero-
geneity of search frictions are not completely unambiguous. There is some evi-
dence for search frictions heterogeneity across skills, but we do not ﬁnd a strong
correlation between the degree of search friction heterogeneity and the extent of
assortative matching across submarkets.
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24Industry
Manufacturing Construction Trade
Labor Quality 1 (L1) 0.058* -0.155* 0.030*
(0.010) (0.019) (0.013)
Female 1.696† 1.539 0.732†
(0.120) (0.566) (0.119)
Aged 30-50 4.751† 0.001† 6.163†
(0.716) (0.002) (2.553)
Aged over 50 7.600† 0.001† 8.874†
(1.370) (0.001) (3.845)
Labor Quality 2 (L2) 0.194* 0.073* 0.112*
(0.014) (0.027) (0.016)
Female 1.200† 1.145 1.128
(0.069) (0.284) (0.099)
Aged 30-50 4.890† 25.289 3.355†
(0.374) (14.289) (0.398)
Aged over 50 3.985† 30.099 3.015†
(0.578) (19.323) (0.535)
Labor Quality 3 (L3) 0.175* 0.420* 0.116*
(0.011) (0.030) (0.013)
Female 1.999† 1.369† 1.405†
(0.167) (0.143) (0.139)
Aged 30-50 1.882† 1.374† 1.659†
(0.155) (0.139) (0.156)
Age over 50 1.676 1.484 0.813
(0.362) (0.345) (0.231)
(L1)2 0.025* -0.033* 0.024*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006)
(L2)2 0.078* 0.036* 0.066*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
(L3)2 0.046* 0.098* 0.030*
(0.004) (0.011) (0.006)
L1 ∗ L2 -0.057* 0.001 -0.013*
(0.007) (0.002) (0.006)
L2 ∗ L3 -0.026* -0.004 -0.009
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
L1 ∗ L3 -0.035* 0.015* -0.014*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Workforce size -0.096* -0.204* -0.152*
(0.008) (0.015) (0.008)
Number of observations 87 786 20 684 96 067
F-test 205.16 134.01 75.58
Table 4: Results for the translog function by industry, for Panel 1
Notes: This panel includes all the ﬁrms observed at least in two years. Fixed ﬁrm eﬀects and a control
variable for the ﬁrm being a single establishment are included in the function. * indicates rejection at 5%
level of H0: coeﬃcient= 0. For the demographic characteristics within each of the labor qualities, the test
of interest is instead H0: coeﬃcient= 1. Rejection at 5% level of this hypothesis is indicated by †. Standard
errors are in brackets. The F-test is the test of global signiﬁcance of the model. The p-value of each of the
presented F-tests is 0.00.
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Panel Manufacturing Construction Trade
Correlation coeﬃcient
Panel 1 (≥ 2) 0.295** 0.371** 0.152**
(0.032) (0.069) (0.038)
Panel 2 (≥ 6) 0.358** 0.486** 0.233**
(0.032) (0.113) (0.039)
Panel 3 (≥ 9) 0.381** 0.485** 0.226**
(0.064) (0.142) (0.059)
Panel 4 (≥ 12) 0.365** 0.631** 0.230**
(0.059) (0.122) (0.056)
Rank correlation coeﬃcient
Panel 1 (≥ 2) 0.329** 0.365** 0.153**
(0.037) (0.080) (0.039)
Panel 2 (≥ 6) 0.399** 0.469** 0.230**
(0.031) (0.122) (0.040)
Panel 3 (≥ 9) 0.411** 0.437* 0.233**
(0.065) (0.169) (0.061)
Panel 4 (≥ 12) 0.381** 0.626** 0.230**
(0.062) (0.148) (0.054)
Regression coeﬃcient
Panel 1 (≥ 2) 2.277** 3.047* 0.995**
(0.265) (1.439) (0.251)
Panel 2 (≥ 6) 2.660** 3.678* 1.362**
(0.252) (1.412) (0.247)
Panel 3 (≥ 9) 2.885** 3.473 1.250**
(0.591) (1.776) (0.358)
Panel 4 (≥ 12) 2.524** 5.353** 1.237**
(0.492) (1.482) (0.318)
Number of observations
Panel 1 (≥ 2) 16040 4382 20259
Panel 2 (≥ 6) 6978 1503 6754
Panel 3 (≥ 9) 3580 672 3062
Panel 4 (≥ 12) 1534 252 1071
Table 5: Measures for assortative matching by industry and panel
Notes: Assortative matching is measured by the relation between the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect and its respec-
tive time average proportion of workers in the highest schooling level. ** and * indicate statistical
signiﬁcance of each as measure for assortative matching at 1% and 5%, respectively.
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Panel Manufacturing Construction Trade
Correlation coeﬃcient
Panel 1 (≥ 2) -0.172** -0.309** -0.158**
(0.035) (0.082) (0.050)
Panel 2 (≥ 6) -0.175** -0.342** -0.199**
(0.039) (0.115) (0.050)
Panel 3 (≥ 9) -0.174** -0.269 -0.203**
(0.061) (0.158) (0.058)
Panel 4 (≥ 12) -0.149** -0.400** -0.247**
(0.053) (0.110) (0.061)
Rank correlation coeﬃcient
Panel 1 (≥ 2) -0.175** -0.294** -0.157**
(0.036) (0.070) (0.049)
Panel 2 (≥ 6) -0.179** -0.294** -0.184**
(0.039) (0.105) (0.049)
Panel 3 (≥ 9) -0.171** -0.229 -0.185**
(0.058) (0.156) (0.058)
Panel 4 (≥ 12) -0.139** -0.358** -0.221**
(0.050) (0.112) (0.056)
Regression coeﬃcient
Panel 1 (≥ 2) -0.692** -1.270** -0.787**
(0.137) (0.817) (0.249)
Panel 2 (≥ 6) -0.679** -1.236 -0.871**
(0.147) (0.636) (0.225)
Panel 3 (≥ 9) -0.694** -0.860 -0.864**
(0.255) (0.796) (0.266)
Panel 4 (≥ 12) -0.577* -1.636** -1.034**
(0.219) (0.587) (0.264)
Number of observations
Panel 1 (≥ 2) 16040 4382 20259
Panel 2 (≥ 6) 6978 1503 6754
Panel 3 (≥ 9) 3580 672 3062
Panel 4 (≥ 12) 1534 252 1071
Table 6: Measures for assortative matching by industry and panel
Notes: Assortative matching is measured by the relation between the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect and its respec-
tive time average proportion of workers in the lowest schooling level. ** and * indicate statistical
signiﬁcance of each measure for assortative matching at 1% and 5%, respectively.
27Number of Schooling Interskill
Years observations Low Medium High diﬀerential
North
87/88 258236 0.234 0.197 0.183 -0.051**
(0.007)
93/94 277390 0.144 0.191 0.174 0.030**
(0.007)
96/97 252829 0.098 0.144 0.143 0.044**
(0.008)
99/00 274401 0.171 0.363 0.376 0.205**
(0.012)
Center
87/88 59777 0.261 0.272 0.260 -0.001
(0.018)
93/94 90281 0.108 0.146 0.138 0.030**
(0.008)
96/97 88589 0.089 0.146 0.155 0.066**
(0.013)
99/00 99460 0.200 0.344 0.359 0.159**
(0.024)
Lisbon and Tagus Valley
87/88 170152 0.172 0.160 0.170 -0.002
(0.007)
93/94 145636 0.175 0.228 0.234 0.059**
(0.007)
96/97 125644 0.091 0.162 0.277 0.186**
(0.020)
99/00 125685 0.158 0.306 0.526 0.368**
(0.020)
Table 7: Indicators for search frictions for Manufacturing, by region and year
Notes: The columns 3, 4 and 5 report our search frictions indicator: the ratio between observed
probabilities of moving to another ﬁrm and of leaving the labor force of the private sector. The
inter-skill diﬀerential is computed as the diﬀerence between columns 3 and 5. Standard errors
(between brackets) were obtained through bootstrapping. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level is
indicated by **.
28Number of Schooling Interskill
Years observations Low Medium High diﬀerential
North
87/88 29898 0.264 0.162 0.280 0.015
(0.039)
93/94 40734 0.150 0.133 0.181 0.031
(0.018)
96/97 42312 0.134 0.128 0.248 0.114*
(0.025)
99/00 55127 0.247 0.356 0.500 0.253*
(0.043)
Center
87/88 7490 0.201 0.121 0.108 -0.093*
(0.032)
93/94 14776 0.154 0.129 0.131 -0.024
(0.023)
96/97 16098 0.152 0.150 0.172 0.020
(0.037)
99/00 22619 0.277 0.331 0.393 0.116*
(0.044)
Lisbon and Tagus Valley
87/88 26116 0.180 0.129 0.169 -0.012
(0.015)
93/94 39065 0.170 0.161 0.275 0.105*
(0.014)
96/97 40429 0.132 0.138 0.248 0.116*
(0.018)
99/00 50646 0.256 0.308 0.572 0.316*
(0.029)
Table 8: Indicators for search frictions for Construction, by region and year
Notes: The columns 3, 4 and 5 report our search frictions indicator: the ratio between observed
probabilities of moving to another ﬁrm and of leaving the labor force of the private sector. The
Inter-skill diﬀerential is computed as the diﬀerence between columns 3 and 5. Standard errors
(between brackets) were obtained through bootstrapping. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level is
indicated by *.
29Number of Schooling Interskill
Years observations Low Medium High diﬀerential
North
87/88 49225 0.161 0.174 0.176 0.015
(0.009)
93/94 66534 0.126 0.179 0.188 0.062*
(0.008)
96/97 83248 0.071 0.127 0.180 0.110*
(0.008)
99/00 102782 0.167 0.329 0.410 0.242*
(0.015)
Center
87/88 16471 0.145 0.160 0.119 -0.026
(0.016)
93/94 26596 0.107 0.164 0.138 0.031*
(0.014)
96/97 35468 0.073 0.128 0.114 0.041*
(0.015)
99/00 43841 0.159 0.321 0.328 0.169*
(0.015)
Lisbon and Tagus Valley
87/88 96655 0.193 0.180 0.206 0.014
(0.008)
93/94 120639 0.173 0.231 0.256 0.083*
(0.005)
96/97 145580 0.090 0.128 0.190 0.101*
(0.052)
99/00 169592 0.197 0.366 0.479 0.282*
(0.012)
Table 9: Indicators for search frictions for Trade, by region and year
Notes: The columns 3, 4 and 5 report our search frictions indicator: the ratio between observed
probabilities of moving to another ﬁrm and of leaving the labor force of the private sector. The
Inter-skill diﬀerential is computed as the diﬀerence between columns 3 and 5. Standard errors
(between brackets) were obtained through bootstrapping. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level is
indicated by **.
30Interskill diﬀ. Correlat. coeﬀ. Regress. coeﬀ.
(a) (b) (c)
Mean 0.067 0.097 0.672
Stand. error 0.084 0.118 1.018
corr(a, b) 0.198
corr(a, c) 0.141
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of search frictions indices and mea-
sures for assortative matching
Notes: For each measure, we have 150 observations. Correlation and
regression coeﬃcients refer to the relation between the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
and the proportion of high-skilled workers. These were estimated based
on the panel including all the ﬁrms observed at least two years.
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